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Those who endorse the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination 
hold that ‘an instance of discrimination is wrong, when it is, because it makes 
people worse off’.1 In a co-authored piece with Adam Slavny, I pressed two 
objections against this view.2 First, the harm-based account implausibly fails to 
recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. Second, the harm-based 
account fails to identify all of the wrong-making properties of discriminatory acts. 
In the light of these failings, we concluded that a more promising account of the 
wrongness of discrimination must ‘focus not only on the harmful outcomes of 
discriminatory acts but also on the deliberation of the discriminator and in 
particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action’.3 
In this brief paper, I defend these conclusions against an objection that has 
recently been pressed against our view by Richard Arneson.4 This task is 
important not only because Arneson’s objection is an intriguing one, but also -- 
and more importantly -- because my response sheds further light on the content 
and structure of an attractive theory of wrongful discrimination, as well as on 
more fundamental ideas in moral philosophy. 
To begin, let’s consider the following case:  
Law Firm: Marta is an Hispanic female who is applying for positions 
in law firms. The members of one firm’s hiring committee accept her 
application, but use their contacts to ensure that Marta’s application 
will also be accepted by her first choice law firm, who’ll offer her a job 
on more generous terms. The committee does this because they do not 
want to work with Hispanic colleagues. Given the generous offer from 
her first choice employer, and because the committee conceals its 
motives, Marta is grateful for the intervention.5 
                                                          
*For helpful discussions about the ideas that appear in this paper, I thank Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, Adam Slavny, and Victor Tadros.* 
1 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of 
Discrimination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 154-155.   
2 Adam Slavny and Tom Parr, ‘Harmless Discrimination’, Legal Theory, 21 (2015), 100-114. 
3 Slavny and Parr, ‘Harmless Discrimination’, 113-114. 
4 Richard Arneson, ‘Discrimination and Harm’ in Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (ed.), Routledge 
Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination (London: Routledge, 2017), 151-163.  
5 This is a variation of a case described in Arneson, ‘Discrimination and Harm’, 156-157. See also 
the case of Cambridge University 3 in Slavny and Parr, ‘Harmless Discrimination’, 109. 
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Two features of this case are important: first, Marta is a victim of wrongful 
discrimination; and second, Marta is not harmed. The upshot of these two facts is 
that harmless discrimination can be wrong and, because of this, that harm is not 
the only wrong-making property of discriminatory acts. It is impossible to 
reconcile these conclusions with the harm-based account, which attempts to 
explain the wrongness of discrimination exclusively in terms of its harmfulness.  
A more promising alternative, I believe, is to incorporate within our account of 
wrongful discrimination a concern for the deliberations of the discriminator. On 
this view, an act of discrimination can be wrong in virtue of the bad intentions 
with which it is performed. This view is well equipped to deal with cases such as 
Law Firm. After all, Marta is subject to racist prejudice, which is a paradigmatic 
case of bad intentions.  
In response to these arguments, defenders of the harm-based account might 
attempt to salvage their position by identifying less obvious ways in which Marta 
is harmed. For example, we might think that Marta suffers a harmful affront to 
her dignity or that she is a victim of an expressive harm.6  In our original paper, 
we outlined a series of objections to this move, and so I shall therefore set it aside 
in this paper.7  
Instead, I shall focus on another objection, which targets the idea that we must 
incorporate a concern for the deliberations of the discriminator within our 
account of wrongful discrimination. In characteristic fashion, Arneson illustrates 
the objection as follows:  
Suppose that in the grip of rancorous and hostile emotions, while 
standing on the sidewalk of busy part of the city, I angrily stick pins in 
a Justin Bieber doll, expressing my unjustified hostility to him, but 
knowing this expressive act is harmless. This act might well be stupid, 
but it seems a long stretch to say it is morally wrong.8 
Arneson’s powerful insight is that acting on bad intentions is not sufficient to 
establish the wrongness of that act. Some acts -- including some discriminatory 
acts -- may be morally permissible, even when performed with bad intentions. 
Instead, he thinks that what matters is whether or not those acts lead to harm: as 
Arneson puts it, ‘the intuition is, no harm, no wrong’.9 If correct, this would 
                                                          
6 For this reply, see D. C. Matthew, ‘Counterfactual Discrimination’, South African Journal of 
Philosophy, 36 (2017), 495-504 at 502 fn. 20. See also Arneson, ‘Discrimination and Harm’, 157 
and Shlomi Segall, ‘What’s so Bad about Discrimination?’, Utilitas, 24 (2012), 82-100.  
7 See Slavny and Parr, ‘Harmless Discrimination’, 106 and 108-109. 
8 Arneson, ‘Discrimination and Harm’, 157.  
9 Arneson, ‘Discrimination and Harm’, 157.  
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provide further support for the harm-based account. (It would also mean that, for 
Marta to be a victim of wrongful discrimination, there must be some sense in 
which she is harmed.)  
Arneson is surely correct that his case does not involve wrongdoing -- that is, he 
is correct to hold that it is not wrong angrily to stick pins in a Justin Bieber doll 
out of unjustified hostility to him. But, this objection misses the mark. This is 
because we need not claim -- and, in fact, did not claim -- that, in cases of 
discrimination, acting on bad intentions is sufficient to establish that act’s 
wrongness.10 Instead, it is more plausible to maintain that a discriminatory act 
can be wrong because of its intentions only if there is some probability that the act will 
affect its target.  
This condition is satisfied in Law Firm, where Marta was in fact affected by the 
firm’s hiring committee. This is why we may conclude that the discrimination 
that Marta suffers is wrong because of the bad intentions of those who reject her 
application out of racist prejudice. However, the condition is not satisfied in 
Arneson’s case, where there is no probability that angrily sticking pins in the doll 
will have any effect on Justin Bieber. This is why we may conclude that the act is 
not wrong.  
Though I’ll avoid precisely spelling out what it means for there to be some 
probability that a discriminatory act will have some effect on its victim, three 
clarifications are helpful. First, the effect need not be harmful. This is the case in 
Law Firm, where the hiring committee affect Marta, but they do not harm her. It 
is by incorporating a concern for harmless effects that we can explain how and 
why harmless discrimination can be wrong.  
Second, a discriminatory act may have some effect on its victim, even if that act 
has no counterfactual effect. This would be the case in Law Firm if Marta would 
have received identical treatment from another law firm if she’d not been subject 
to the discrimination that she in fact suffered. In that case, the hiring committee 
would still wrong Marta, even though their actions would have no counterfactual 
effect.11 
Third, in judging whether there is some probability that a discriminatory act will 
have some effect on its victim, we should distinguish between belief-relative, 
evidence-relative, and fact-relative probabilities. At the very least, we must 
                                                          
10 Thus Arneson is misunderstands our view when he writes, ‘The claim would be that, contra 
Slavny and Parr, these features of acts [involving bad intentions] are never sufficient to establish 
their wrongdoing’. See Arneson, ‘Discrimination and Harm’, 157.  
11 For further discussion, see Victor Tadros, ‘Overdetermination and Obligation’ (unpublished 
manuscript).     
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dispense with the idea that a discriminatory act can be wrong because of its 
intentions only if there is some fact-relative probability of the act having some 
effect on its target.12 To see this, let’s consider a variation on Law Firm, in which 
the firm’s hiring committee decide to discriminate against Marta on racist 
grounds only if it is sunny on the day of reading her application. As luck would 
have it, it rains that day, and so the committee choose not to discriminate against 
Marta. It is intuitive that the committee still wrong Marta even though, given the 
deterministic laws that govern our weather, there was no fact-relative probability 
of the act affecting Marta. This case reveals what is unduly restrictive about 
insisting on there being a fact-relative probability of a discriminatory act having 
some effect on its target in order to be wrong because of its intentions. 
This leaves open the question of which kinds of probabilities matter. My own 
view is that belief-relative, evidence-relative, and fact-relative probabilities can 
each be sufficient in these cases. On this view, it can be wrong angrily to stick 
pins into a Justin Bieber doll, expressing my unjustified hostility to him, under all 
of the following conditions: (i) when I believe that there is some probability that 
this will affect him, even though there is no evidence for this belief, and even 
though this turns out not to be the case; (ii) when there is evidence of there being 
some probability that this will affect him, even though I do not recognise this 
evidence, and even though this turns out not to be the case; and (iii) when I do 
not believe that there is any probability that this will affect him, and when the 
evidence supports this belief, but it turns out that he is affected. I find it 
powerfully intuitive that I act wrongly in cases (i)-(iii), though I acknowledge 
both that others may disagree, and that it is unsatisfactory to rely exclusively on 
such intuitions in constructing a complete account of the conditions under which 
an act of discrimination can be wrong because of its intentions. Fortunately, 
however, it is not necessary to resolve these issues in order to reply to Arneson’s 
objection. Rather, I mention this here merely to draw attention to the relevance 
of broader philosophical questions to this investigation and to the kind of 
considerations on which I have relied.  
                                                          
12 For further discussion, see Tom Parr and Adam Slavny, ‘What’s Wrong with Risk?’ 
(unpublished manuscript). 
